A conventional PWR of type VVER-440 operating in a sustainable advanced fuel cycle mode with complete recycling of TRU elements in an Inert Matrix Combined Fuel Assembly (IMC-FA) in the same reactor was investigated. A preliminary assessment with the differences between various nuclear fuel cycles in terms of the risk analysis and its indicators has been conducted. The results indicate that the sustainable advanced fuel cycle option can, for the same amount of energy generation, significantly reduces both the amounts and radiotoxicity of the spent nuclear fuel in comparison with the conventional once-through UO 2 or MOX fuel cycles.
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the serious problem of nuclear energy industry is how to deal with back-end of the fuel cycle. The argument used by the opponents of the utilization of nuclear energy is the long-term risk caused by the long-lived radionuclides that occur in the spent nuclear fuel (SNF)/high-level waste (HLW) of nuclear power plants (NPPs). A possible solution of the nuclear fuel cycle is the final disposal of discharged fuel assemblies into geological formations. However, approximately 95 percent of reactor waste is uranium, which by itself does not require long-term or permanent storage. The rest is plutonium and other transuranics and fission products (FP). The transuranics and fission products are far more hazardous than uranium.
In the developing technologies of transmutation methods long-lived radionuclides are transmuted to the non-toxic or short and middle time lived radionuclides. This solution also demands the final repository but the requirements on this nuclear installation are considerably reduced.
There are significant differences between risks depending on the type of the nuclear energy system and also the same can be stated about the different strategies of waste management and disposal, e.g., on the type of the fuel cycle. Many nuclear experts in the transmutation of spent nuclear fuel area consider light water reactors (LWR) as an efficient chain link of multi-tier transmutation system [1] . The multi-tier transmutation system is a proposal of cooperation between thermal reactors and fast reactor or accelerator-driven system (ADS) to achieve effective transmutation of problematic radionuclides. The role of thermal reactors is to transmute partially plutonium and some of minor actinides in the thermal neutron spectrum. The fast reactors or ADS should be able to reduce mainly the rest of the minor actinides and some fission products as well. LWR is considered mainly for transmutation of most plutonium and some other minor actinides, which are fissionable in the thermal neutron spectrum [2] . Similar use of light water reactor VVER-440 (Russian design) with hexagonal fuel assemblies as the possible first tier of the multi-tier transmutation system is presented in this paper. The aim of this work was to analyse and compare the risk for the environment, which potentially threatens in various fuel cycles, e.g., from accumulated spent nuclear fuel in standard used assemblies, or which might potentially result from MOX fuel or transmuted advanced inert matrix combined fuel assemblies (IMC-FA). The comparison of produced selected transuranium nuclides in the mentioned assemblies with various beginning composition in terms of the risk analysis and its indicators is shown.
MODELS OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES
The risk indicators comparison of three models of fuel assemblies for various nuclear fuel cycles is made to show which one is better from the point of view of the amount of reduction of selected nuclides in the spent assembly and subsequently also the risk from it.
The models are a standard uranium fuel assembly, a mixed oxides (MOX) fuel assembly, and an inert matrix combined fuel assembly.
The uranium fuel assembly (U-FA) in Fig. 1 is a model of a currently operating fuel assembly at six VVER-440 reactors in Slovakia. There are 126 uranium fuel pins (UPs) in U-FA and the mean enrichment of U-235 is 3.82% wt. at material density UO 2 equal to 10.1 gram per cm 3 . At U-FA, there are three sorts of UP enrichment: 3.3% wt., 3.6% wt., and 4.0% wt. They are used for flattening radial assembly power distribution.
The model of mixed oxides fuel assembly (MOX-FA) in Fig. 2 is in conformity with reactor conditions of the VVER-440; therefore the MOX-FA has the same geometry as U-FA. The only difference is the material composition of fuel pins. The MOX-FA is profiled and there are three kinds of fuel pins (MPs). They contain dioxides of plutonium and depleted uranium (0.3% wt. of U-235). The content of plutonium is different for every kind of MP and the individual contents are 3.7% wt., 6.0% wt. and 10.1% wt. to reach the mean content of the plutonium 8.39% wt. The total material density of MOX fuel is 10.1 gram per cm 3 . The inert matrix combined fuel assembly (IMC-FA) [2] in Fig. 3 is a model of fuel assembly setup to reduce more transuranic elements (mainly plutonium) than it is at mixed oxides fuel assemblies. IMC-FA has two sorts of fuel pins. The first ones, uranium pins (UPs, which are the same sort of pins as in the case of U-FA but with higher enrichment) are intended to keep necessary reactivity of assembly during the whole burn-up period. The purpose of the second ones, transmutation pins (TPs) is mainly transmutation of plutonium and some other transuranic elements. For this role of TPs, the composition of TPs is dioxides of transuranic oxides that are held at an inert matrix of zirconium dioxides.
IMC-FA is given for the conditions of the VVER-440 reactor; therefore the geometry of IMC-FA is the same as the one for U-FA. But at the IMC-FA there are only 96 UPs and the rest of the 30 pins are TPs. The TPs at IMC-FA contain 7% wt. of dioxides of all transuranic elements from spent U-FA and the rest is 93% wt. for dioxides of zirconium. The total density of nuclear fuel material in TP is 5.843 gram per cm 3 . The ratio of the amount of individual transuranic element in TPs is the same as in the spent standard uranium fuel. UPs in IMC-FA contain 4.4% wt. of U-235 at total density of UP fuel of 10.1 gram per cm 3 . The higher enrichment (U-235) of UPs at IMC-FAs than the one at U-FA uranium pins was suggested to approach multiplication properties of IMC-FA to currently used U-FA with a mean enrichment 3.82% wt. of U-235.
Structure of IMC-FA was designed to flatten radial assembly power distribution on the one hand and to reach maximal plutonium reduction during burn-up on the other hand.
SOURCE TERM CALCULATIONS
The first step in evaluating the risk by means of indicators of long-term risk was modelling of the burnup process in LWR reactor VVER-440. The simulation of the process was made by spectral code HELIOS [3] . At the beginning the standard VVER-440 hexagonal uranium fuel assembly (U-FA) with 126 pins was used as user input in the burn-up process. The burn-up of 40,000 MWd/tHM was reached. In a similar way MOX-FA and IMC-FA were simulated.
The next task was the calculation of spent fuel inventory in each assembly for various time periods, inclusive burn-up specifics for each reactor cycle and with the cooling time. The assembly was cooled in the spent fuel pool for 5 years and its material composition was changed. All mentioned calculations were performed by the code ORIGEN (SCALE) [4] . These calculations determined the quantities of actinides and fission products contained in the spent fuel.
INDICATORS OF LONG-TERM RISK
The quantity most widely used today to characterize the long-term risk of radioactive waste is radiotoxicity. A concept of radiotoxicity in this study refers to the expected radiation dose in case of a release from storage. The unit of this quantity can be Sv/g or Sv/kg if it refers to the mass of isotopes or total mass of waste. The radiotoxicity is defined:
where A i is activity of i-radionuclide (Bq) and DCF i is the dose conversion factor (Sv/Bq) for radionuclide i, which gives the dose due to the intake of a unit activity of the given radionuclide. During the operating period of NPP, uranium is producing a large scale of radionuclides. Introducing the ratio of the total radiotoxicity of the produced radionuclides to the radiotoxicity of the uranium from which the given nuclides arose a relative quantity so-called relative radiotoxicity can be defined. According to the definition, its value is:
where Θ D (t) is the radiotoxicity of the waste, while Θ D,U (t) is that of natural uranium. In view of the extremely long half-life of natural uranium, the radiotoxicity is small and, as a first approximation, can be considered constant in million years terms.
If one requires that the radiation dose on the biosphere due to the waste produced in an NPP should not exceed that of the natural uranium, by the consumption of which the radwaste was produced, it must be isolated from the biosphere as long as the relative radiotoxicity defined by (2) would not drop below 1. This is so-called necessary time when radwaste should be under control. In the case of the open fuel cycle this period is on the order of a million years.
In order to evaluate the long-term risk, the radiotoxicity values are not sufficient. Therefore further quantities should be defined [5] . The residual hazard performs an integral quantity that is proportional to the risk in excess of natural uranium until the end of necessary storage time. The value of the residual hazard is based on the calculations of radiotoxicity earlier defined. Thus it can be written:
The residual hazard index is well applicable to evaluate the different nuclear energy systems and is useful to compare them in long-term risk respects:
where K r,j (t) is the residual hazard for type j fuel cycle system at time t (Sv.year/kg) and K r,O,i (0) is the residual hazard for type i open fuel cycle system at the beginning time (t = 0).
RESULTS OF SIMULATION
The results of calculations of residual hazard and residual hazard index for selected transuranium nuclides in spent assemblies used in various FC are shown in Figs. 4-9 . On all figures the solid, dashed, and dotted lines show the time dependence of risk indicators for standard U-FA, MOX, and inert matrix fuel assemblies, respectively. Results are presented for Np-237, Pu-239, and Cm-244. From the point of view of long-term risk of Pu-239 reduction, about 35% during several thousand years was achieved at the IMC-FA in comparison with standard U-FA. On the contrary the risk is 2.5 times higher for spent MOX-FA. This is caused by high initial Pu enrichment and TRU production from U-238 at the MOX-FA.
As the whole U-FA (126 pins) and only 30 TPs of the IMC-FA are directed into the deep repository, following the conclusion for IMC-FA to be initiated per pin. The transmutation effect in the thermal neutron spectrum at the IMC-FA is also significant. The mass of the Pu-239 at the end of U-FA burn-up is 6.26 g/pin but at the IMC-FA it is 0.97 g/pin only. The Pu-239 mass was reduced down to 15.5% by transmutation. In the case of MOX-FA the mass of Pu-239 is increased up to 3.32 kg/ass. in comparison with 0.789 kg/ass. in U-FA, which means 4.2 times more.
On the other hand risk of Np-237 and Cm-244 on the assembly level of the both CFCs is higher in relationship to the U-FA. However, on the cycle level the very high contents of incoming TRU elements from the previous cycle into IMC-FA must be taken into account and the final risk of IM-CFC is significantly reduced.
CONCLUSION
The TRU risk reduction of spent nuclear fuel on the assembly level from the reactor VVER-440 was determined as a function of time by two risk indicators. It was shown that the inert matrix combined fuel assembly is a much more effective tool for plutonium mass reduction than the MOX fuel assembly. On the assembly level closed fuel cycles exhibit reduction of residual hazard index for plutonium but an increase in this indicator for higher actinides.
It seems to be highly probable that the time when radwaste should be under control is equal to the time needed to approach the radiotoxicity level of the consumed natural uranium. During this time the radionuclides must be isolated from the biosphere to be transmuted.
Simulation of the transmutation process for three various assemblies in the core of the LWR reactor shows significant transmutation potential. It would be necessary to continue in its detailed analysis on the cycle level.
The choice of correct methodology for the determination of the objective radiological risk was important in selecting the appropriate waste management strategy.
